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a. P. richardson,

Editor

EDITORIAL
A Dangerous Develop. In the course of a recent tour of cities in
ment of Corporation the middle west by officers of the Ameri
Laws
can Institute of Accountants for the
purpose of meeting with Institute members and other account
ants, the president of the Institute drew attention to a compara
tively novel trend in legislation which he felt constituted a serious
danger to the business world in America. This peril is exempli
fied in an enactment of the Delaware legislature during the session
of 1929, providing for further laxity in the determination of the
use which corporations may make of cash received in payment for
capital stock without par value. For some time there has been
evident a tendency toward a liberality and an absence of restraint
in corporate law, which may involve a most serious menace to all
business. Delaware is merely one of the more complacent states.
It is not necessarily the worst; there are several others in which
the acquiescence of legislators is remarkable. But the Delaware
incident will serve for purposes of illustration, and it is of interest
to read what is written in the newly amended corporation law,
which went into effect March 22, 1929. Section 14, as revised,
reads:
Subscriptions to, or the purchase price of, the capital stock of any cor
poration organized or to be organized under any law of this state may be
paid for, wholly or partly, by cash, by labor done, by personal property,
or by real property or leases thereof; and the stock so issued shall be de
clared and taken to be full paid stock and not liable to any further call, nor
shall the holder thereof be liable for any further payments under the pro
visions of this chapter. And in the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors, as to the value of such labor, prop
erty, real estate or leases thereof, shall be conclusive.
As to corporations incorporated prior to April 1, 1929, shares of capital
stock without par value, whether common or preferred or special, may be
issued by the corporation from time to time for such consideration as may
be fixed from time to time by the board of directors thereof, pursuant to
authority conferred by the certificate of incorporation or, if such authority
shall not be so conferred on the board of directors, then for such considera
tion as may be fixed by the consent in writing of, or by vote of, the holders
of record of two thirds of the total number of shares of each class of stock
then outstanding and entitled to vote in respect thereto, such vote to be
given at a meeting called for that purpose in such manner as shall be pre-
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scribed by the by-laws. As to corporations incorporated on or after April
1, 1929, shares of capital stock without par value, whether common or pre
ferred or special, may be issued by the corporation from time to time for
such consideration as may be fixed from time to time by the board of
directors thereof, unless in the certificate of incorporation the power to fix
such consideration shall have been reserved to the stockholders, in which
event such power shall be exercised by the stockholders by consent in
writing or by vote of the holders of record of two thirds of the total number
of shares of each class of stock then outstanding and entitled to vote in re
spect thereto, said vote being given at a meeting called for the purpose in
such manner as shall be prescribed by the by-laws; provided that, although
such power has been reserved to the stockholders, the directors shall never
theless have power to fix such consideration for the first issue of stock, and
such issue shall not exceed ten per centum of the whole amount of such
stock authorized by the certificate of incorporation. Any and all shares
without par value so issued for which the consideration so fixed has been
paid or delivered shall be deemed full paid stock and shall not be liable to
any further call or assessments thereon, and the holders of such shares
shall not be liable for any further payments in respect of such shares under
the provisions of this chapter.
Any corporation may by resolution of its board of directors determine
that only a part of the consideration which shall be received by the corpora
tion for any of the shares of its capital stock which it shall issue from time
to time shall be capital; provided, however, that, in case any of the shares
issued shall be shares having a par value, the amount of the part of such
consideration so determined to be capital shall be in excess of the aggregate
par value of the shares issued for such consideration having a par value,
unless all the shares issued shall be shares having a par value, in which case
the amount of the part of such consideration so determined to be capital
need be only equal to the aggregate par value of such shares. In each such
case the board of directors shall specify in dollars the part of such considera
tion which shall be capital. If the board of directors shall not have deter
mined (a) at the time of issue of any shares of the capital stock of the
corporation issued for cash, or (b) within sixty days after the issue of any
shares of the capital stock of the corporation issued for property other than
cash what part of the consideration for such shares shall be capital, the
capital of the corporation in respect of such shares shall be an amount
equal to the aggregate par value of such shares having a par value, plus the
amount of the consideration for such shares without par value. The
capital of the corporation may be increased from time to time by resolution
of the board of directors directing that a portion of the net assets of the
corporation in excess of the amount so determined to be capital be trans
ferred to capital account. The board of directors may direct that the
portion of the excess net assets so transferred shall be treated as capital in
respect of any shares of the corporation of any designated class or classes.
The excess, if any, at any given time, of the total net assets of the corpo
ration over the amount so determined to be capital shall be surplus.

Lest there should be any misunderstand
ing of the intent of the law or any overscrupulous director should hesitate to
pay out as dividends capital under its new name, surplus, section
34 provides:

Protection for the
Directors

Dividends; Reserves:—The directors of every corporation created under
this chapter, subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of in
corporation, shall have power to declare and pay dividends upon the shares
of its capital stock either (a) out of its net assets in excess of its capital as
computed in accordance with the provisions of sections 14, 26, 27 and 28 of
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this chapter, or (b), in case there shall be no such excess, out of its net profits
for the fiscal year then current and/or the preceding fiscal year; provided,
however, that if the capital of the corporation computed as aforesaid shall
have been diminished by depreciation in the value of its property, or by
losses, or otherwise, to an amount less than the aggregate amount of the
capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes
having a preference upon the distribution of assets, the directors of such
corporation shall not declare and pay out of such net profits any dividends
upon any shares of any classes of its capital stock until the deficiency in the
amount of the capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of
all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets shall have
been repaired. Subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of
incorporation, the directors of any corporation engaged in the exploitation
of wasting assets may determine the net profits derived from the exploi
tation of such wasting assets without taking into consideration the
depletion of such assets resulting from lapse of time or from necessary
consumption of such assets incidental to their exploitation.

This seems broad enough in all conscience—or perhaps one should
say, out of all conscience—but merely to remove any possibility
that a doubt or a fear may linger in some directive mind a new
clause has been written into the law, which reads as follows:
A director shall be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
books of account of the corporation or statements prepared by any of its
officials as to the value and amount of the assets, liabilities and/or net
profits of the corporation, or any other facts pertinent to the existence and
amount of surplus or other funds from which dividends might properly be
declared and paid.

In other words, if $100,000 is received by a company incorporated
under the laws of Delaware in payment for capital stock of no par
value, and if there is no other class of stock, and the liabilities are,
let us say, $10,000, the directors may determine that $90,000 of
capital is no longer capital but is now surplus, and they may, if
they deem it expedient or salutary, declare the full amount of
$90,000 in the form of a dividend to the stockholders. And, if
some stockholder is an old-fashioned person who fails to see the
advantage to the company of distributing all its assets in the form
of dividends and decides to bring suit against the company for
impairment of capital, negligence or other offense against decency,
he can not succeed in his suit because the directors, who are the
persons directly responsible, are exonerated by the law and held
harmless.

Principle of No-par- When the first laws authorizing the
issuance of shares without par value
value Stock Is
Sound
were enacted, the innovation was gener
ally acclaimed, and it was hoped that a way had been found by
which the anomalous and misleading fiction of par value could be
445
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avoided and the interests of investors protected. But like many
fine ideas, the no-par-value law has not developed in practice as it
was expected to develop. It has become the plaything of a hun
dred corporation lawyers who have special purposes to serve.
Nearly every legislature is besieged with requests for amendments
of corporation law which will permit the individual besieger to do
some particular thing which existing law prohibits or at least pre
vents. Lawyers are generally supposed to advocate the interests
of their clients, and it must be confessed that corporation lawyers
as a whole have not been indifferent to their loyalty to the corpora
tions which employed them. It may even be affirmed without
much fear of contradiction that a great number, if not actually a
majority, of the corporation lawyers who are engaged in the effort
to influence legislation are animated solely by a desire to bring
about the enactment of a law or an amendment which will serve
primarily the interests of one corporate entity. It is not on record
that the lawyers representing any one corporation have often de
voted their attention with marked perseverance to the furtherance
of legislation of purely general merit.
The no-par-stock laws have been
amended time and time again and some
of them have assumed so great an
elasticity that they are now justly regarded as being all permis
sive. Some, such as the law in Delaware to which we have re
ferred, do not deserve the title “law” at all. They are merely
licence. As we understand the principles of jurisprudence, the
purpose of a law is to define what may not be done, leaving it to
the good judgment of the public to do those things which are not
forbidden. Turn to any code of laws and one will find that they
are almost exclusively in the form of “ do not.’’ The fundamental
code of Sinai is all prohibitive, with one exception. Such a law as
that in Delaware purporting to govern the management of cor
porations seems to be almost wholly concerned with explaining
what may be done in contravention of what should be done. It
is a great pity that the no-par-stock law has been so bandied about
that it has lost almost all its virtue. It might have been a
splendid means of permitting the fair expression of the value of
stock ownership, but when it reaches so low a level that it specifi
cally allows impairment of capital and absolutely unjustifiable
distribution of capital in the form of dividends, the time has come

Recent Changes Are
Perilous
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to cry “Halt!” Every accountant knows that the things which
are being done under some no-par-stock laws are at utter variance
with sound principles of business and accounting. Perhaps the
lawyers who are chiefly responsible for the enactment of our
multiplicity of legislation do not fully understand how grave is the
danger into which their acts are leading business. As has been
said, they have first their clients to consider. The rest of the pub
lic can go hang. But the accountant is in a different category.
He knows the fundamental laws upon which successful business is
based, and he knows positively that the diversion of capital for the
purpose of building up a surplus which may be distributed in the
form of dividends, when in point of fact no profits may have been
earned, is a certain means of wrecking any business.
This leads to the broader question of the
What the Accountant
duty of the accountant. Obviously no
May Do about It
reputable accountant will be involved,
even indirectly, in the impairment of capital of a company, what
ever the law of an individual state may say about the matter. If
a law justified theft one would scarcely argue that thieving is good
morality. At present the country is going through an era of
great financial prosperity. There may be differences of opinion
as to the condition of industry and commerce, but in the realm of
finance there can be no serious question that prosperity to an
extraordinary extent exists. Capitalization is one of the great
problems which accompanies such a wave of prosperity. New
companies are formed; old companies are amalgamated; holding
companies are created to control groups of lesser companies.
And one of the most constantly considered elements of the prob
lem is that of capital structure. That in turn brings in its
train the highly controversial question of what may be justly
classified as earned surplus. This is a field in which the account
ant is the only man competent to guide affairs and it is, therefore,
of the utmost importance that the accounting profession should
give thought to the modern trend of legislation, and especially to
the dangers which are created by the new laxity in no-par-stock
laws. Legislators do not understand, lawyers as a rule are quite
innocent of any knowledge of business principles, and business
men themselves are far too much concerned with other matters to
give serious consideration to such apparently theoretical questions
as the difference between capital and surplus. What is the duty
447
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of the accountant? In the first place, it seems clear that his
voice should be heard in protest against anything which may
impair the capital of a company. He should decline to have any
thing to do with any company which would take advantage of
iniquitous laws to perform iniquitous acts. But on the other
hand one knows that there may be a few men who will accept ap
pointment as auditors if the fees be large enough, whatever may
be the ethics of the corporation’s directors. It seems on the
whole that the most effective method of preventing disaster would
be to bring to the attention of lawyers, bankers, business men,
etc., the gravity of the peril which exists and to solicit the support
of all who are related to business for an educational campaign to
prevent legislators from making fools of themselves and wrecks of
business. And, lest some of our readers should feel that the laws
of their own states are so superior to the laws of Delaware that
there can be no possible comparison, it might be well to suggest
that the accountants of every state should look carefully into the
corporation laws to see exactly how much latitude there may be
for the incorporation of companies in a manner which will place
the interests of the investing public in jeopardy. The danger is
not imaginary; it is real and it grows. In order to avoid any
possibility of misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that there
are hundreds of companies operating under no-par-stock laws in
a manner which is entirely above reproach. It is not with the
companies and their acts that we are primarily concerned, but
with the laws which permit corporations to do things which no
decent corporation would do.
In the May issue of The Journal of
An Arkansas Law and
A
ccountancy we ventured to express
the Accountant
warm approval of a section of a new
statute in Arkansas. The law in question levies a tax upon in
comes and provides that whenever a return is filed and a certified
public accountant, duly authorized under the laws of Arkansas,
certifies that he has made an audit of the taxpayers’ records for
the income year and has prepared the return to which his certifi
cate is attached, such return shall be accepted by the commissioner
as prima facie true and correct. It did not occur to us that
anyone would have serious quarrel with such a provision, but
we have received a letter from C. O. Wellington, a member
of the council of the American Institute of Accountants, who
448

Editorial

thinks that the Arkansas law is without merit.
writes:

Mr. Wellington

Possibly your question on page 364 of the May number of The Journal,
“Where, then, can one find cause for opposition to the progressive plan of
Arkansas?” was inserted for the purpose of inviting a reply and starting
discussion. I, for one, certainly find myself very seriously in disagreement
with the unqualified praise you appear to give the section of the Arkansas
law which you quote in your editorial.
If accounting were an exact science and true income was capable of exact
measurement, there would be considerable merit in the suggestion, but, as
has been pointed out again and again, many matters that come up in ac
counting are solved as questions of opinion and on some points the opinion
of one competent accountant might be substantially different from the
opinion of another accountant equally competent. However, what is of
more importance is that the administrative officers for the federal govern
ment, and presumably for all the states having income-tax laws, naturally
interpret each law as passed so that every doubtful point is decided in
favor of the government and regulations under each law are issued ac
cordingly. If, therefore, the accountant preparing the return is to be any
more than a mere clerk putting together certain figures taken from the
books, he must often find himself in disagreement with regulations and he
must often advise his client that, in his opinion, certain regulations are
contrary to the letter or spirit of the income-tax law and, when tested in
the courts, will be upset. The experience we have all of us had with the
federal government in the last fifteen years is ample evidence on this point.
In my opinion, instead of a movement such as that in Arkansas being
encouraged, it should be very definitely discouraged, as it puts the ac
countants in the false position of trying to serve the government and the
client at the same time. While, of course, no reputable accountant will
misstate the facts, he will often disagree with the government authorities as
to the interpretation of the law and regulations bearing upon those facts,
and he should be free to advise the client for the client’s own best interest
and not be subject to any penalty or even criticism if he fails to follow every
regulation laid down by the taxing authorities. I believe if an accountant
is competent he will find many instances in which he will and should refuse
to follow the income-tax department’s interpretation of the law.
I am very sorry that The Journal has given even this much support to
an idea which I believe to be fundamentally unsound until those who pass
our laws, and particularly those who administer them, are willing to decide
income-tax questions on the basis of fairness and equity. If that time
should come, which I doubt under our present type of government, I would
then agree that accountants could cooperate as suggested, but, in the mean
while, with the taxing authorities leaning so heavily in favor of the govern
ment and against the taxpayer, it is necessary, to have even an approach
toward justice, for the taxpayer and the accountant to lean heavily the
other way.

In reply to the comments of Mr. Wellington let us say at once
that the notes which are the subject of his criticism were not in
serted for the purpose of starting a discussion. We welcome dis
cussion, but this did not seem a good starting point. We looked
for unanimity. However, having studied carefully the objections
which our correspondent raises, we confess to an inability to
understand the cause of the protest. There is nothing in the
Arkansas law to say that a certified public accountant who signs
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a tax return becomes a mere clerk. There is nothing in the law to
indicate that the accountant must give up an individual sense of
right and wrong and follow a given form. There is nothing in the
Arkansas law to discourage the expression of absolute disagree
ment with anything that the authorities of Arkansas may lay
down in the form of regulations. Every accountant, of course,
knows that there are many times when it is imperative that he
should differ with the federal government, the state government,
or any other government—and we do not feel that the condition
under what Mr. Wellington describes as "our present type of
government” is peculiarly unfair. It seems to be quite com
monly believed that most of the persons charged with the duty of
administering tax laws handle a very difficult task with a good
deal of tact and patience. No one loves a tax gatherer, and there
does not seem to be much reason why one should, but that is no
cause for saying or believing that officers of the government are
necessarily wrong. The taxpayer himself, his attorney or his ac
countant may be absolutely wrong. All that the Arkansas law
intends and says is that the statement of a public accountant shall
be accepted as “prima facie true and correct.” That does not in
volve a false position at all; it does not call for serving the govern
ment and the client at the same time, although it may be said
parenthetically that the accountant should serve the government
and the client at the same time. Fair play calls for fairness to all
the players. We differ with reluctance from so able a friend as
Mr. Wellington, but having read his criticism we adhere with
utter stubbornness to our first contention that the law of Arkansas
is a good law and worthy of imitation.
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